CHAPTER 6 The Sirens of Elea: Rationalism, Monism and Idealism in Spinoza YITZHAK MELAMED The main thesis of Michael Della Rocca's outstanding Spinoza book (Della Rocca 2008a) is that at the very center of Spinoza's philosophy stands the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): the stipulation that everything must be explainable or, in other words, the rejection of any brute facts. Della Rocca rightly ascribes to Spinoza a strong version of the PSR. it is not only that the actual existence and features of all things must be explicable, but even nonexistence-as well as the absence of any feature of any thing-demands an explanation. Della Rocca does not stop here, however. He feeds his PSR monster with some more powerful steroids and suggests that Spinoza advocates what he terms "the twofold use of the PSR." It is not only that everything must be explained and made intelligible, but it must ultimately be explained in terms of explicability or intelligibility itself. Thrs twofold use of the PSR is the key to the entire book. Della Rocca's strategy throughout the book is to argue that any key feature of Spinoza's system-be it causality, inherence, essence, consciousness, existence, rejection of teleology, goodness or political right-must be explained, and ultimately it must be explained in terms of intelligibility. "spinoza single-mindedly digs and digs until we find that the phenomenon in question is nothing but some form of intelligibility itself, of explicability itself' (see p. 71 above). Della Roccals book came out together with a cluster of articles in which he develops in detail his new reading of Spinoza.l In one of these articles, he warns the reader: "Don't let me start" (Della Rocca 2010, 1). The train that is about to embark leads to verybizarre terrain, and thus one should think twice before embarking on the "PSR Express." In this chapter I argue that the train The Sirens of El'ea: Rationalism, Monism and Idealism in Spinctza . 79 was hijacked. This was a perfect crime: without anyone noticing it, the engine driver diverted the train to a new route, and as with other perfect crimes, it is only the criminal himself who is capable of bringing about his own demiseas indeed he will. As I will later argue, Della Rocca's "PSR-on-steroids" will eventually cripple reason itself. But let us not run too fast-we'Il start at the very beginning. I happily-or at least, so I think-board the "PSR Express." I believe Spinoza is strongly committed to the PSR and makes very significant use of this principle, but, unlike Della Rocca, I do not think the PSR is the key to all mysteries Spinozist, nor do I believe Spinoza was committed to the reductionist program of explaining all things through intelligibility (i.e. the second use of the PSR). Della Rocca's exciting intetpretationraises several deep, foundational, questions but unfortunately I can only address a few of them here. In the following I will concentrate on three issues related to Della Rocca's reading. I will first point out the non-trivial danger of misuse of the PSR, and then turn to examine the validity of Della Rocca's inference from the unavailability of explanations of facts to the reiection of the same facts. I will conclude with a critical examination of Della Rocca's claim that the PSR does not allow for any bifurcations in nature. On the Possible Misuse of the PSR The PSR is a powerful tool and, like any other powerful tool, it can be misused. Leonhard Euler (1707-1783), the great Swiss mathematician who was essentially sympathetic to the principle, warned against the "wretched abuse" of the PSR by those who "employ it so dexterously that by means of it they arc in a condition to demonstrate whatever suits their purpose, and to demolish whatever is raised again them" (Euler 2009, 224). Euler was particularly alarmed by proofs which rely on the PSR to achieve nothing over and above a petitio principii (or question-begging argument) (Euler 2009, 226). But Spinoza, himself, pointed out the tight connection between a rushed use of the PSR and religious superstition. Consider the following example presented by Spinoza in the appendix to Part One of the Ethics: If a stone has fallen from a roof onto someone's head and killed him, they will show, in the following way, that the stone fell in order to kill the man. For if it did not fall to that end, God willing it, how could so many circumstances have concurred by chance (for often many circumstances do concur at once)? Perhaps you will answer that it happened because the wind was blowing hard and the man was walking that way. But they will persist: why was the wind blowing hard at that time? Why was the man walking that way at that same time? If you answer again that the wind arose then because on the preceding day, while the weather was still cahn, 80 . Yitzhak Melamed the sea began to toss, and that the man had been invited by a friend, they will press on-for there is no end to the questions which can be asked: but why was the sea tossing? Why was the man invited at just that time? And so they will not stop askingfor the causes of causes until you take refuge in the will of God, i.e. the sanctuary of ignorance. (lapp; Spinoza 1925, II.80-t) There are three striking features of the superstitious that contrive together to produce the phenomenon spinoza examines here. First, the superstitious adhere to the PSR in a very strict and systematic manner, or as spinoza writes "they will not stop asking for the causes" of things. second, the superstitious are not willing to allow for coincidences, i.e. the concurrence of events whose cause (i.e. the cause of the concurrence) is not easy to explain, and perhaps even impossible to explain, by appealing only to the causes of one or the other concurring events. Finally, the superstitious are satisfied by a uni!'ing and global explanation-the will of God-which upon close examination turns out to be nothing but ignorance (insofar as God's will is taken to be arbitrary or self-explanatory). similarly, in chapter 9 of the Theological Palitical rreatise, spinoza mocks those who believe that every slight abnormality in the Hebrew of the biblical text discloses great secrets and mysteries (Spinoza LgZs,I]IrI3S). Obviously, Spinoza does believe that all features of the biblical text-just like any features of any text, or anything-deserve an explanation. Yet, the explanation may not be availqble to us, not because it involve great secrets, but rather because we know very little about the precise causal history of almost any particular thing, while the superstitious do have the right urge to insist on asking conscientiously about the causes of things, their use of the psR is both too strong and too weak: too strong be cavse when no natural explanation is readily available to them, they conclude that there is no natural explanation, and too weak, because they shelter "the will of God" from the policing authority of the psR (i.e. it is not subject to their demand for explanation). What should we learn from all this? Not much, at this point. We should just be aware of the rather obvious possibility that the pSR can be misused. "Une:rylainable" Throughout his book Della Rocca frequently makes truly insightful and illuminating use of the PSR to help motivate various positions of spinoza's, yet, in several crucial places in the book, he uses the psR in a manner I find to be flawed.2 In all ofthese places Della Rocca attempts to rule out a certain putative state of affairs F, by arguing that if F were the case, F would be-o, *ou1d bring about-a brute fact, and hence must be relected since the pSR does not allow for brute facts. Della Rocca uses the same sirategy in all of these cases: First, he The Sirens of EIea: Rationalism, Monism and Idealism in Spinoza . 8l Dresents F, the putative fact which he intends to rule out using the PSR. Then,^h. pt.r.tttt two or three explanations that could motlrte or justifr F, and shows that none of the suggested explanations succeeds in motivating F-so far, so good. At this point comes the announcement that "no explanation of F is available." But if F is not explicable, it is a brute fact' and hence must be rejected bY force of the PSR. The problem with this line of argument is that Della Rocca seems to argue from: (I) we have no explanation of F (2) Fknotexplainable or, in slightly different fashion, from (3) we have no explanation af F (4) F seems to be unexplainable (5) Fts abrutefact. Such arguments fail to appreciate the modality required for the proper use of the PSR. To claim that so far we have not found any explanation for F is one thing. To claim that there is no possible explanation for F is a completely different thing. As an example of a proper use of arguments from inexplicable facts, consider Leibniz's argument-in his correspondence with Clarke-against the possibility of absolute space. Here, too, Leibniz uses the PSR in order to rule out a certain state of affairs: the existence of absolute, empry space. Leibniz's argument is roughly the following: Suppose space could exist without anFhing in it. Then, God, when he cornes to decide where-in space to create the world, could have no reason to create the world in any particular location, because all spatial locations in empty space are qualitatively indiscernible. Whatever reason God could have to create the world at place Pl, should equally pertain to any other place (in absolute space) P2, since there cannot be any qualitative difference between P1 and P2. Thus, God cannothave a reason to create the world in one place rather than another (AG 324). Notice that the argument does zolrely on the claim that so farwehavenot found a reason that iillt ; t:li{ liili . !-, ll {r' ;ririi 'rrtri i tf J ".ll i L., i ii:; t; jr' ':i I ,,,t '., rl 82 . Yitzhak Melamed could motivate God to create the world in Pl rather than p2. Leibniz's argument relies on the far stronger claim that therc cqnnot be a reason for God to create the world in Pl rather than P2. In other words, Leibniz argues from: (6) there cannot be reason for F to (7) F is a brute fact. while the transition from (6) to (7) is valid, the rransitions from (1) to (2) and (3) to (5) are not. It is perfectly possible (and in fact quite common), that no explanation for a certain fact F is available to us right now, but F is still perfectly explicable (and the explanation might even become accessible to us in the future). In other words, in order to be valid, the argument must positively show that it exhausted all possible explanations, and that none of these explanations is successful. Proving exhaustibility is, in most cases, quite a daunting task, and demands more work than merely ruling out three or four explanations. In order not to leave these severe allegations (e.g. ofa "hijacked train" etc.) up in the air, let us look quickly at two texts where, I believe, Della Rocca makes an unwarranted use of the PSR. In the first text, the author attempts to show that for Spinoza all mental states are representational. Della Rocca presents the view he attempts to rule out-that for Spinoza some mental states are representational while others are not-and asks by virtue of what both representational and non-representational states are mental. He rightly disqualifies one explanation and then restates the question: what is it in virtue of which A and B are both thinking? perhaps they are both mental in virtue of the fact that they causally interact with mental states. But this won't get us very far. For spinoza, two things interact only because they belong to the same attribute, for example the attribute of thought, I know of no other plausibly spinozistic way to answer the question what is in yirtue of which A, a representational mental state, and B, a nofirepresentational mental stette, are both thinking. Thus the existence of such disparate mental states would inttohte a brute fact and so be unacceDtable. (ZOOea, nt) Notice how Della Rocca moves from the claim that "I know no other plausibly spinozistic" explanation for the disparity of mental states, to the conclusion that such a disparity is a brute fact. This move is, in my mind, illicit. Della Rocca could defend his view by suggesting that while his argument may fall short of proving his point conclusively, it still shifts the burden of The Sirens of Elea: Rationalism, Monism and Idealism in Spinoza ' 83 oroof to the opponent of the twofold use of the PSR' Perhaps, so Della Rocca's lrno-.ttt *orrld go, we should tentatively consider F (the fact for which we fru"* no, yet found any explanation), a brute fact, and thu s tentatively reject it'3 iaorrUt this defense strategy could work. There are far too many things whose explanation is not transparent to us. I, for one, do not know the complete ,"pturrutiott for almost anlthing I encounter. Should I therefore tentatively .on.lud. that these things do not exist (as long as I have no complete explanaiion fo, eachX The counter-commonsense nature of such a radical form of skepticism seems to me much less troubling (since Spinoza frequently rejects .o.-on sense) than the inconsistency of this view with Spinoza's disparaging rejection of skepticism.a Consider, for example, Spinoza's claim in 2_p13c and 2pl7s) that "the human body exists as we ale aware fsentimus] of it." In these purrug., Spinoza does not require that we know the complete explanation of in. nu-utr body (this could be achieved only rarely through the Third Kind of Knowledge), but rather feels comfortable enough to pronounce that the human body exists relying merely on our awareness of the body' There is an even stronger consideration against the inference from tentative lack of explanation for F to the tentative rejection of F, but here I can only point out the direction of that afgument. In many cases we cannot provide an adequate explanation for either F or its opposite' Thus, if we follow Della Rocca's line of defense, we should conclude that both F (insofar as we have no adequate explanation for not-F) and its opposite (insofar as we have no adequate explanation for F) are the case, which is clearly absurd' Another instance in which Della Rocca relies on the unavailability of explanation to rule out a certain state ofaffairs is in his discussion of divine teleology in Spinoza. Here, I think, the temptation of the easy "no explanation is available;' argument leads Della Rocca to an imprecise representation of Spinoza's argument against divine teleology. Della Rocca's aim in the following passage is to motivate Spinoza's rejection of divine teleology, a view which he cashes out narrowly as a rejection of any case in which God acts for the sake of anypatttoilat finirebeing x. Della Rocca points out (rightly) that every finite mode x is part of a strictly necessary and deterministic causal chain of finite modes and then argues that God cannot act for the sake of one of these finite things since God cannot arbitrarily privilege one link in the chain over the other: ,c, the finite mode in question, is necessarily in the midst of a series of finite causes and effects, but, we are supposing, x nonetheless outstrips other modes in importance to God. Why does God privilege x in this way instead of privileging some other finite mode, say, certain of x's causes or x's effects? X is neither the culmination of the series of finite modes, nor is it the starting point. So these natural reasons for privileging ,r are not present. Nor can it be said that God privileges x because .r is more like ijltr I r,1il .,flh ri'r' '; tl'' l ',:L L t,i ;i1 :l Nri J"J lilll d,. t; ;,'l' ;i: t 'i 'i .. il llr .,4 I il :l rl 84 . YitzhakMelamed God than other finite modes. For each divinelike quality that rhas, there will be other, perhaps infinitely many other, finite modes that have those divine-like qualities to a higher degree . . . For this reason, any privileging of xin particular would seem to be arbitrary, a brute fact. Ani, as such. Spinoza would reject it. (2008a, 85-6) Here, too, Della Rocca considers two explanations that could justify the view he is arguing against. He shows that neither explanation works, and concludes that in the absence of any explanation, the privileging of x is a brute fact. Bu! here too, as far as I can see, the transition fto* ".rlo explanation for F is available" to "F is unexplainable" is faulty. Della Rocca's focus on the question of whether God could privilege one finite mode over the other leads him to misformulate spinoza;s critique of divine teleology. Spinoza does not limit his critique of divine teleology to the rejection of divine action for the sake of a finir.e thlng; rather,for spinoza, God acts for the sake of. no one, not even for His o*n rok (see lapp; spinoza 1925, iI.80.23). Thus, unjustified privileging of one item over another does not seem to provide the motivation for spinoza's rejection of divine teleology. God is c_lear[ and' justly privileged in comparison to the finite modes, but Spinoza's God does not act for the sake of himself as welr. Since brute privileging does not seem to be the primary motivation behind Spinoza's critique of divine teleology we must seek an explanation elsewhere. The lesson I suggest we draw frorn the tereology issue is that not finding an explanation for a certain fact does not warrant rejecting it as a brute fact. In the case of teleology, we find a purported brute privileging which, upon examination, turns out to be not-brute privileging. yet Spinoza's ..fusal to make his God act for the sake of ayrzstlyprivilegedentity (iuch as Go<l himself) shows that the rejection ofbrute facts cannot provide the principled explanation for Spinoza's rejection of divine teleology. Bifurcations and Radical Monism At the opening of his book, Della Rocca briefly explains Spinoza's naturalism as "the view that there are no illegitimate bifurcations in reality,, (see p. 74 above). It is not that difficult to agree with the claim that there are no itlegitimatebifurcations in reality, but the rear question is whether there are legitimatebifwcations in realiry and Della Rocca seems to me to be tempted bythe sirens of Elea, and defends the far stronger claim that rejects any iifurcations in reality, tout court. _ one crucial place where this bold view surfaces is in Della Rocca's attempt to show that, for spinoza, inherence and causation are strictly identical. According to Della Rocca, both inherence and causation are relations of conceptual The Sirens of Elea: Rationalism' Monism and Idealism in Spinoza ' 85 dependence (I do not agree with this view, but I'll grant it for the sake of the ar[ument).t At this point Della Rocca presses the following question: What makes [inherence and causation] distinct? This is a pertinent question, because, after all, they do have something in common: they are both kinds of conceptual dependence. Wherein do they differ? It's hard to see the difference here as anything other than a brute fact. There seems to be no way to elucidate the difference or to explain what it consists in except to say that mere causal dependence is the kind of conceptual dependence that, for example, bodies bear to God . . . and inherence is that kind of conceptual dependence that, for example, states of bodies bear to those bodies. Such an answer merely states that there is a difference between inherence and mere causation without explaining what the difference consists in. (2008a,76-7) I have argued elsewhere that the identification of inherence and causation is inconsistent with some of Spinoza's most important metaphysical doctrines'6 For shortness of space I will avoid repeating these arguments here, but let me present here four other issues related to the internal consistency of Della Rocca's crusade against bifurcations. First, one possible answer to the question of what makes inherence and causation distinct is that their concepts make them what they are and ground the distinction between them. Oddly enough, in spite of Della Rocca's battle against primitive distinctions, he is, on occasion, amenable to analytic explanations that ground the qualities of things in their essences' or natures' or concepts, and stop there. Consider the following passage in which Della Rocca attempts to show that to represent a thing r is to represent its essence: Given that E is the essence of a and given that for Spinoza, as we have seen, the essence of a thing simply amounts to the very intelligibility of the thing, the way in which the thing must be understood, it follows that to ask why x has E is as silly as asking why squares have four equal sides. It's part ofthe essence, and indeed part ofthe concept, ofsquares to have four equal sides-this is how squares must be understood' In the same way, it's just x's concEt or essence to have E. (2008a, 97; italics added) It is somewhat unclear to me why it is sillier to ask why a square has four sides, than to ask why an inherence relation is a relation in which one thing is in another. Let's compare the two cases. Inherence and causation are both allegedly relations ofconceptual dependence. Squares and triangles are both polygons. We can ask what distinguishes squares from triangles and the answer we t:ta l lt{ ;lil, t tlt' ,4ii .1i1 "jlr ;;l' :llqrr !|tr, ,i,', ''' ,' l, i.l ',1 -86 . Yitzhak Melamed are likely to get will appeal to the very essence of each (i.e. "squares have four sides," etc.). Similarly, we may ask what distinguishes inherence from causation and the answer we are likely to get will appeal to the very essence of each relation (i.e. "an inherence relation is one in which x is in 1" etc.). Where, p1scisely, is the difference between the two cases? What kind of analytic explanations, which virtually just restate the essence of the thing, is Della Rocca willing to accept and what kind is he not willing to accept? On its face, the distinction between the two cases seems to be just brute and arbitrary. Second, for all I can tell, Della Rocca's argument against bifurcation seems to commit him to an extremely radical version of monism that rejects any kind of bifurcations and allows for the reality of merely one indiyisible thing and merely one concept. Here is a brief outline of the argument leading to this conclusion.T Suppose there were any two distinct concepts, Cl and C2. We could legitimately ask by what virtue Cl is what it is and not C2, and why C2 is what it is and not Cl. Cl and C2 have something important in common: we assumed that they are both concepts (neither giraffes nor elephants!). Why are they different then? Wherein lies the difference? Of course, we can push the question slightly by saying that Cl has quality Q and C2 doesn't, but here we should employ the same strategF Della Rocca uses constantly against "illegitimate" bifurcations, and ask why Cl has Q and C2 doesn't. (They are both concepts! Where does rfols difference come from?) In this manner, we are not likely ever to reach a satisfactory explanation, and hence the difference between C1 and C2 would seem to be a brute fact. Similarly, since for Spinoza, natura flaturans (i.e. the substance) is strictly indivisible, we could (and should) ask where the diversity of things comes from. if at the verybeginning of things-at the level of substance-there is strict uniry and indivisibility, we should detect the first appearance of diversity, and ask by virtue of what we have two things that are distinct. (In this case, I think the question is very powerful since we can show that the only possible explanation -i.e. natura nah.4rans, from which the diversity sprung-is strictly indivisible and thus cannot explain the diversity. Thus, I take the last question to be a genuine and serious problem for Spinoza, not only for Della Rocca.)8 If we take the above arguments against bifurcation seriously, the ensuing view is the acosmist interpretation of Spinoza, suggested by the German Idealists (Maimon and Hegel), according to which Spinoza considered any diversity (the diversily of modes as well as the diversity of attributes) a mere illusion. Let me note that Hegel takes avariantof the PSR-the"ex.nihilo nihilfif' formula-to be the main motivation behind Spinoza's alleged acosmism (Hegel 1969,84; Hegel 1991, 144). While I find the acosmist reading fascinating, I believe that in the final account it has to be rejected since it conflicts with far too manyimpofiant doctrines of Spinoza's. Consider, for example, Spinoza's claims in E1pl6d thatitis theintellectthatinfers the modes from God's nature. The Sirens of Elea: Rationalism, Monism and Idealism in Spinoza ' 87 For Spinoza, the intellect never errs' but were the modes unreal or illusory' the ;;;;r.. of the intellect would clearly be faulty-contrary to Spinoza's view'e"'io tfr. best of my knowledge, Della Rocca does not wish to endorse tt . orifirrut "ersion oithe acosmist interpretation, but rather a certain moder- ,i. ,.rri"" of it, according to which modes are neither /ully real, nor are they Itiorory.,. This view is cor*rect in a very trivial sense insofar as modes are less ,."f rfrL,' the substance (the reality of modes depends on the reality of the sub- ,i.rc.1.,, However, Della Rocca also suggests that the limited reality of modes ,.fl..t, the fact that modes are not fully conceived and fully causedby the substance (for Della Rocca, degrees oi reality reflect degrees of conceivability).l'z This, I think, is not consistent with spinoza's claim in E1p16d that the modes .r. i"f.rr.a Uy the intellect. Were the modes not fu\ conceived, the inference of the intellect would have to be faulty' Third, one of the most interesting results of the claim that only the substance is fully real is that it forces us to feevaluate the status of relations in ifnoru, most crucially the relation of conception.l3 If there is only one fully .eal thirrg, and plurality pertains only to partly realthings, it would make sense that radJnahryshould be exhibitediulty atthelevel of the fully real entity (and only partly at ihe level of the partly real plurality of things). Let's have a closer tooi. ut the doings of our fully real entity' \ On first sight, our one indivisible entity may appear somewhat boring' Iust like the Aristotelian Prime Mover, it keeps on conceiving itself, and conceiving itsell and-surprise, surprise-once again conceiving itself. "we11' what's wiong with that?" you might say, "We have long suspected that heaven is prettF borin!.', One problem is iirat iris not at all clear that our entity is even entitled to this kind of activity. According to Della Rocca, there is really only one relation: conceivability is causation ii inherence. (If there were any other relation, we would ask, "By virtue of what is it distinct from conceivability?" etc') But wait, why is conceivability a two-place relation and not, say, a monadic predicate, such as "x is conceived"? since there is only one entity ill our fully real realm, it would make just as much sense to cash out rationality as a monadic predicate, "x is conceivecl" or ".rc is conceiving" (which one? and how can we decide between the two?), or as apolyadic two-place reflexive relation "x is conceived through r" or as a zillion-place polyadic relation, "x is conceived through x, through r, . . . through x," There seems to be no reason to privileg" uiwo-pla.e riefle"iv" relation of conceivability over monadicpredicate of co"nceivabiiity, or the other way around. Whatever choice we make would be a brute fact. But let's assume for a minute that we can justify a choice of one of the disjuncts. Let,s say the monadic predicate. Our fully real entity has the one monadic predicate of "x is conceir.ing." Recall that there are no other concepts (on the pain of there being brute faits: "what makes them distinct from conceiving?;'). Here, then, isJur paradigm of pvre rationality and explanation: "The 88 . Yitzhak Melamed substance is conceiving." what preciselydoes this explain? Howpoor does this radical, rock-smashing, rationality end up being? Finally, let me note that if we push the bifurcation argument slightly further ahead, we could ask in virtue of what do we distinguiih betw"ei the subject ("substance") and its predicate ("is conceiving")? \Mere they strictly the same, I cannot see how in such a world there would be any moyement or thoughi at all. such a world would be far too poor, far too thin, to entertain thougit. Recall that for spinoza the excellence of minds is a function of their com_ plexity, which reflects the complexity of the paraller bodies (2p13s). when we detach the substance from its modes we seem to get an entitywith infinitesimal complexity and an extremely dumb thought.ra we can reach the same conclusion from a slightly different angle. Since for spinoza the only vehicles of thought are ideas (2a3 and 2p1rd), and ideas are modes (2a3), it would seem that if the PSR leads to rhe unreality (or limited reality) of modes, it ends up proving the unreality (or limited reality) of ideas and thougfut itself. The last two points seem, to me, cut not only against Della Rocca's view as an interpretation of Spinoza,but even against an attempt to present this view as an independent venture, going beyond spinoza. These two points show that the radical, strict, rationalism of the twofold use of the psR ends up undermining and crippling reason itself. As I warned you at the beginning of this chapter, it was none but the capable, yet psR-intoxicated, enginl driver of our hijacked train who brought about his, and reason,s, own deriise. Acknowledgement An early version of this chapter was read at an author meets critics session on Della Rocca's book in the 20 r 0 meeting of the Eastern division of the American Philosophical Association. I would like to thank John Brandau, Don Garrett, Mike LeBuffe, John Morrison, Alan Nelson, sam Newlands, oded schechter, and especially, Michael Della Rocca, for their most helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter. Notes 1. See Della Rocca (2003, 2008b, 2010, and forthcomine). 2. Iaddressbelowthetwocasesofrepresentationandteleology.Foranolhercrucialexampleof this,line of argument, Della Rocca's identification of .uusut-ion and inherence in Spinoza, see Deila Rocca (2008a, 65). The Sirens of Elea: Rationalism, Monism and Idealism in Spinoza . 89 9. On the German ldealists' acosmist interpretation of Spinoza, see Melamed(2010). For a detailed oitique of the acosmist reading, see Melamed (20I2a). See DellaRocca (forthcoming, Section III). Consider, for example, an axiom Spinoza adopts from Descartes: "A substance has more reaiitythan an accident or mode" (DPP Part I, Axiom 4; Spinoza 1925,I.154.27). See Della Rocca (forthcoming), Section III, and Della Rocca (2008a, 263)' Della Rocca develops and embraces some of the implications I discuss below in Della Rocca (forthcoming). 14. While the human mind can conceive many things (2p14), the substance detached from its modes conceives nothing but one thing: itself. 10. ll. t'l 3. 4. 5 D. 7. o. Della Rocca actually suggested a response in this spirit in a session on his book at the Eastern Division meeting of the American philosophical Association in December 2010. See Spinoza's Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect,SS4T_48; Spinoza lgg5,22. For Della Rocca's reduction ofcausation to conceivability s eep,74 above. See Melamed (2012b). Della Rocca seems to embrace this conclusion in Della Rocca, forthcoming. I address this problem in Melam ed (2012il.